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ABSTRACT
Many have claimed that in the dependent market economies of Central and
Eastern Europe industrial policy has been reduced to incentives to foreign investors
– a feature accentuated by their loss of policy space through integration into the
European single market. In this paper, we offer an alternative view by arguing that
the European Union (EU) has in fact made it possible for its members to recover a
degree of policy space lost to economic and regulatory integration. The EU does
this through transnational industrial policy, which is the combination of its competi-
tion and cohesion policies. The former limits cross-country competition for capital;
the latter provides additional resources to support a more inclusive industrial policy
benefiting small and medium enterprises (SMEs). However, effective utilization of
transnational industrial policy depends on domestic state capacities. We demon-
strate this by comparing the distribution of EU funds to automotive firms in Poland
and Romania. In Poland, efforts to create institutions that promote SMEs have
resulted in a more balanced distribution of EU resources, while in Romania a weak
and unstable institutional environment led to their greater concentration, thereby
reducing European funds to another source of rents for the most powerful firms.
KEYWORDS
Dependent market economies; EU funds; transnational industrial policy; upgrading; automotive industry;
Central and Eastern Europe
1. Introduction
Globalization brought a radical retreat of traditional industrial policy.
Transnational regulatory integration has rendered its most prominent tools, such
as manipulation of trade policy to capture investment and promote exports, and
targeted support of domestic champions, either illegal or too costly. Development
scholars described this as ‘kicking away the ladder’ (Chang, 2002) or ‘shrinking
policy space’ (DiCaprio & Gallagher, 2006; Wade, 2003) and argued that it
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prevented developing countries from nurturing successful manufacturing industries.
Even those who stress that globalization has brought new opportunities for indus-
trial growth through rising foreign investment and global production networks
admit that joining the transnational value chains is not the same as building them
(Baldwin 2011).
The latter insight forms the core argument of a burgeoning ‘new dependencia’
literature, which is concerned with the limits of foreign capital-led development.
The strong version of the argument posits that reliance on foreign investment cre-
ates dependent market economies (DME), which are locked into a semi-peripheral
position without credible perspectives for industrial upgrading (N€olke &
Vliegenthart, 2009). This is because innovation and broad capacity-building in the
host countries do not feature in the strategies of foreign companies which can
always source their inputs and technologies elsewhere. While DMEs may develop
successful FDI-based export sectors, these remain disconnected from domestic pro-
duction and innovation systems, and the lack of industrial policy tools leaves host
countries unable to push their economies ahead in the transnational value chains.
Moreover, competition for foreign capital drains domestic resources from other
industrial policy objectives such as support to small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), which would facilitate a more broad-based integration into transnational
production networks.
While we recognize that regulatory constraints and capital mobility significantly
narrow the policy space for developing countries, we find the strong version of the
‘new dependency’ argument to be overly restrictive. Despite the common external
constraints, developmental outcomes still vary, even among countries with osten-
sibly similar positions in the global production system. This suggests that some
space for manoeuvre is still available to developing economies, and makes it all the
more urgent to explore alternatives they can pursue to carve a better position for
their firms in the world of global value chains.
In line with the overall argument of the Introduction to this Special Issue, we
argue that variation in developmental outcomes is determined by how pressures of
globalization are filtered by developing countries’ own institutions, as well as by
the institutions of the transnational integration regimes (TIRs) in which they are
embedded (see Bruszt and Langbein, this issue). Globalization notwithstanding,
transnational economic and regulatory integration largely take place within these
regionally circumscribed blocks, and some of them, the European Union (EU) in
particular, have gone especially far in curbing their members’ ability to pursue
autonomous economic policies (Hay, 2004; Jabko, 2006). Yet, it would be wrong to
see TIRs merely as steamrollers of globalization, for they are also the primary sites
for transnational institution- and policy-building: a way to ‘manage’ globalization
(Jacoby & Meunier, 2010), and a potential source of new opportunities for domes-
tic agency (Bruszt and Palestini, 2016). These opportunities come in the form of
specific regulatory and financial tools that can be used to offset the negative conse-
quences of economic integration.
Indeed, while the EU may be the most extreme example for how economic inte-
gration prevents countries from regulating their own markets, it also has the most
advanced set of regulations and compensatory tools to alleviate some of the nega-
tive externalities of this process (Bruszt and Langbein, this issue). In other words,
while preventing its member states and many associated countries from pursuing
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independent industrial policies that rely on protection and discriminatory promo-
tion of domestic economic actors, the EU has accumulated a battery of resources
and policy tools that amount to a novel form of transnational industrial policy.
In this paper, we explore the scope and limitations of this transnational indus-
trial policy, by focusing on the use of the EU’s policy tools in the Central and East
European (CEE) member states. The CEEs are textbook examples of DMEs.
Having entered the world economy in the full swing of transnational economic
integration, they had to rebuild uncompetitive socialist-era industries without
recourse to the recipes of the late twentieth century developmental states. Instead,
they embarked on a foreign capital-led, ‘hyper-integrationist’ developmental trajec-
tory which was both directly and indirectly encouraged by the EU (Medve-Balint,
2014), and which rewarded them with rapid integration into global value chains
(Scepanovic 2013), but at the price of becoming thoroughly dominated by foreign
firms. Consequently, CEE exhibited most of the symptoms highlighted by the ‘new
dependency’ literature: dearth of domestic firms in the export-oriented sectors, lim-
ited investment in technologically advanced activities, and excessive spending on
incentives to foreign capital (Drahokoupil, 2009; Pavlınek, 2018).
To what extent can transnational industrial policy alleviate these negative effects
of foreign-led development? In this paper, we show that certain EU policies could
assist CEE states to evade the developmental trap envisioned by DME scholars:
while EU state aid regulations prevent costly competition for capital, EU funds
help to diversify industry and nurture SMEs. However, to successfully exploit these
opportunities, the states must also possess a considerable degree of domes-
tic capacity.
We study the interaction of transnational industrial policy and domestic capaci-
ties by analyzing public support to the automotive industry in two CEE states,
Poland and Romania. Both countries are heavily dependent on foreign capital and
have been subjected to ‘deep’ integration with the EU (Bruszt and Vukov, 2017),
including harmonization with European state aid and competition policies. Both
also received financial and technical assistance to implement these measures, as
well as to better manage further EU financial support. However, Poland and
Romania differ in their domestic state capacities, which allows us to explore the
limits to the transnational industrial policy.
This is also the reason why we chose the automotive industry, which represents
one of the prime examples of highly integrated transnational modes of production.
Lead firms dictate much of what happens further down in the chain, including the
degree to which they are open to access from smaller local firms (Gereffi,
Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005; Humphrey & Memedovic, 2003). The industry has
also long been among the primary targets of investment competition in CEE, and
thus offers a critical case for testing the reaches of industrial policy, both domestic
and transnational, in the age of global value chains.
The following section describes the two arms of the EU’s transnational industrial
policy: regulations to restrict competition for capital, and funds to support SMEs.
Next, based on a unique dataset that combines company-level financial and owner-
ship data with records of EU funding to private firms in the 2007–2013 program-
ming period, we explore the degree to which the distribution of funds in the Polish
and Romanian automotive industries complies with the objectives of transnational
industrial policy. We find that Poland has been more successful at diversifying
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funding than Romania, where EU support is biased towards large firms. In
Section 3, we trace this variation to different levels of state capacity, as reflected in
the network of domestic public institutions supporting SMEs. The final section
concludes and suggests further directions for inquiry.
2. The workings of transnational industrial policy in the EU’s
eastern periphery
The EU’s transnational industrial policy comes in two guises. The first takes the
form of ‘beneficial constraints’ (Bruszt, Munkacsi & Lundstedt, this issue), whereby
the EU’s state aid regulations prevent states from depleting their own budgets in the
race to attract foreign investment. The EU specifies strict ceilings on all such subsi-
dies, but these are set higher for backward regions in order to raise their attractive-
ness to investors. Second, the EU’s cohesion policy provides additional funding to
promote research and development, innovation, and upgrading of smaller firms in
less developed areas. This assistance, which is distributed through operational pro-
grams (OP) designed jointly by the European Commission and national govern-
ments, is not limited to the provision of funding but is accompanied by a transfer of
capabilities and ideas that guide the implementation of these funds.
While the debate on the costs and benefits of EU-imposed constraints on invest-
ment promotion is quite advanced, the contribution of cohesion policy to industrial
policy is yet to be explored (but see Duman & Kurekova, 2012). However, we argue
that to understand the scope and limitations of the EU’s transnational industrial
policy, we need to investigate both dimensions.
The combination of EU funding and the state aid regime’s beneficial constraints
allows transnational industrial policy to remedy three interlocked problems: bolster
the bargaining power of governments vis-a-vis large firms by ‘tying their hands’
with a binding framework for incentives; prevent harmful competition between
states; and provide additional resources to promote horizontal policy goals. The
resulting policy recalls the classical principle of ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans 1995)
– allowing governments to work closely with companies in pursuit of development,
but without falling prey to rent-seeking by the most powerful private firms.
At the start of the EU integration process, CEE was in dire need of help on
both fronts. The socialist legacy and the vagaries of transition have left these coun-
tries thoroughly dependent on external capital, and the competition for mobile for-
eign investments soon escalated (Drahokoupil, 2009). Foreign companies
capitalized on this by staging ‘beauty contests’ between prospective hosts, driving
up the value of incentives in a region that was already considered one of the most
attractive locations for manufacturing investments in Europe. This is not only
wasteful, as the countries overpay investments that would have probably taken
place anyway, but could also drain domestic resources away from other policy
goals. Indeed, smaller domestic enterprises were initially excluded from investment
support, which was conditional on high capital thresholds. Other forms of assist-
ance were sparse, and the underdeveloped local capital markets could not plug this
gap, thereby limiting the SME’s potential for growth (Volz, 2011).
The EU’s transnational industrial policy created opportunities for CEE countries to
tackle both problems. First, the state aid rules substantially contained investment com-
petition. While the CEE states originally resisted imposition of state aid regulations for
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fear that it will undermine their ability to attract investment, they were well aware of
the costs, and in the post-accession period they all exhibited a remarkable degree of
compliance (Blauberger, 2009). However, while the EU rules eliminated excessive aid
to individual investment projects, the total amount and composition of state aid did
not change radically: the most powerful firms still win a lion’s share of the subsidies
and the automotive firms are often among them. In Romania, between 2007 and
2014, roughly half of 800 million EUR of state aid dedicated to investment promotion
went to automotive firms (see Vukov, this issue). In Poland, between 2004 and 2013
the total value of automotive investments exceeded EUR 3.3 billion, and nearly 30% of
these investments received state aid (PAIiIZ, 2014).
With domestic funds still primarily focused on attracting foreign capital, the EU
cohesion policy became a significant resource for diversifying support to a broader
range of recipients, in particular SMEs. EU funds represent a high proportion of
CEE’s overall spending on industry, and even national funds, as well as loans and
grants from other international institutions are often linked to the OPs. This means
that transnationally defined policy concepts and priorities considerably shape the
industrial policies of these member states. The EU’s impact, however, is not limited
to material incentives, but also includes ideational and institutional elements. Both
before and after the accession, the EU trained public servants and sought to develop
member states’ institutions in charge of fund management to preempt corruption
and wasting of resources (Bailey & De Propris, 2004; (Bruszt and Vedres, 2013).
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these transnational tools depends crucially on
domestic agency, more specifically on domestic institutional capacities. This is espe-
cially true when the tools require not only regulation, as in the case of the state aid
regime, but positive intervention, as in the case of cohesion policy. While the
Commission is closely involved in the formulation of the national OPs, it has no dir-
ect control over implementation. Moreover, while the stated policy objective of the
funds is to help weaker players, they are allocated competitively which may favor
firms with greater ability to formulate projects and navigate through the application
process. Finally, while the EU funds to private firms follow the same rules as those
of state aid – that is, they are bound by the regional ceilings and indexed to the size
of the project so that larger investments receive proportionally lower funding – they
never cover the entire cost of the project. This means that to be successful, the appli-
cants must also have sufficient own resources or access to other funding.
In these circumstances, achieving the goals of transnational industrial policy
greatly depends on the capacity of domestic institutions to provide consulting serv-
ices to SMEs, assist their applications, and help them to leverage complementary
funding. Without this domestic institutional support, EU funds risk becoming just
another source of subsidies for large, powerful companies instead of diversifying
spending from these firms to SMEs. In the next section we investigate whether EU
funding in the automotive industry in Poland and Romania has avoided this risk,
and to what extent it reflects the original objectives of transnational industrial policy.
3. Distribution of EU funds to the automotive sector in Poland
and Romania
The following analysis relies on a unique dataset in which we combined information on
company size, ownership, employment, and financial performance, with data on EU
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contracts. In the first step, based on industry codes, we identified both carmaker and
supplier companies active in the automotive industry and cross-checked the informa-
tion obtained from commercial databases1 with the records of the national automotive
industry associations.2 We considered only those active companies that reported recent
financial, employment, and ownership data. The resulting dataset has 824 Polish and
526 Romanian firms. Next, we matched the firm-level data with the publicly available
information on individual contracts of EU-funded projects from the 2007–2013 pro-
gramming period.
Following the European Commission’s guidelines (European Commission,
2003), we classified the firms by size (micro-, SME, and large enterprises), and by
ownership (foreign or domestic, based on the country of registration of the ultim-
ate owner). Table 1 summarizes their key characteristics. Not surprisingly, while
the majority of firms are micro-enterprises and SMEs, the large companies domin-
ate the sector both in employment and revenue. Furthermore, the overwhelming
majority of the large firms are foreign-owned. Our dataset thus reflects the well-
established fact that the automotive industry in CEE is entirely dominated by large,
mostly foreign-owned businesses on which the sector’s future development depends
(Pavlınek, 2017). With such dependence on a handful of large, highly mobile com-
panies in a key industry, it is no wonder that domestic investment promotion pol-
icy has been heavily skewed in their favor (see also Bohle, 2006).
The EU funds, however, are designed specifically to counter this bias. The pro-
grammatic objectives of the EU cohesion policy insist that the majority of funding
should be allocated primarily to smaller firms. Both Poland and Romania tried to
resist this demand, pointing to the large firms’ contribution to the countries’ over-
all competitiveness, but they received limited concessions from the Commission.3
This is evident from the design of the OP Innovative Economy in Poland and
Increase of Economic Competitiveness in Romania, which were the main channels
of EU funds to private firms in 2007–2013.4 In Poland, 70% of the resources in the
OP Innovative Economy were explicitly reserved for SMEs; while large firms were
allowed to bid for funding mostly under budget lines targeting strategic invest-
ments, R&D and Innovation. (Ministry for Regional Development, 2009). In
Romania, too, allocations to large firms were limited to 20% in the budget line
Table 2. Contracted EU funding to the automotive industry in Poland and Romania (2007–2013
budget period).
Country Firm size
Number of
auto-motive
firms
receiving
EU funds
Number of
funding
contracts
Share (%) of
funding
contracts
from
automotive
contracts
Total EU
funding
(mn EUR)
EU funding
per contract
(mn EUR)
Poland Micro 10 12 2.70% 1.57 0.13
SME 128 313 70.34% 52.14 0.17
Large 61 120 26.97% 243.53 2.02
Total 199 445 100% 297.24 0.67
Romania Micro 1 1 0.79% 0.13 0.13
SME 44 64 50.80% 27.36 0.43
Large 39 61 48.41% 113.48 1.86
Total 84 126 100% 140.97 1.12
Note: Based on funding contracts signed until November 2016.
Source: The authors’ own calculation.
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supporting capital investments. Nevertheless, no such restrictions were imposed in
priority areas promoting R&D and energy efficiency, but the amount of funding
available through these channels was also much smaller. Moreover, to ensure
adequate attention to SME projects, separate intermediary bodies were set up to
oversee applications by SMEs (Ministry for SMEs, Trade, Tourism and Liberal
Professions in Romania and the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development [PARP]
in Poland).5
To what extent does funding to SMEs reflect these programmatic efforts to
increase their access to EU resources? Overall, the results seem promising: exclud-
ing the automotive sector, only a small fraction of the beneficiaries were large
enterprises (8% in Poland and 3% in Romania) and their share of the total number
of funding contracts was also low (14% in Poland and 4% in Romania).
In the automotive industry, however, the situation was very different. In Poland,
27% of all the automotive funding contracts were signed with large firms, and in
Romania they won nearly half of the contracts (48%; Table 2).6 In both countries
over four-fifths of all the EU funding distributed to the automotive sector has been
secured by large companies (82% in Poland and 81% in Romania), and more than
a quarter of the large firms in this sector received at least some EU funding (29%
in Poland and 27% in Romania). Large enterprises were also among the biggest
beneficiaries: in Poland, the largest contract was signed with Bridgestone, which
received EUR 24 million for upgrading its tire factory in Stargard, followed by
Fiat’s EUR 20 million for extension of an engine plant in Bielsko-Biała. In
Romania, the largest grant (EUR 19.5 million) went to Romcab, a domestically-
owned manufacturer of automotive conductors and wiring, followed by EUR 10.4
million to Renault’s engineering center. What is more, the vast majority of these
projects involved purchase of capital equipment and services and only a tiny por-
tion was genuinely related to R&D and innovation activities (Scepanovic and
34
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Figure 1. Distribution of EU funding contracts among private firms and in the automotive industry by firm
size in Poland and Romania (2007–2013 budgetary period).
Note: a two-sample Z test for proportions (z¼ 4.09; p< 0.01) confirms that the share of contracts with auto-
motive SMEs significantly differ between Poland (70%) and Romania (51%).
Source: the authors’ own calculation.
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Medve-Balint, 2019). The above figures reflect the concerns of the dependency
argument and suggest that in this sector the ambitions of the EU’s transnational
industrial policy have been heavily tempered by the large firms’ structural domin-
ance and superior fund absorption capacity.
However, a closer look at the data reveals a more nuanced picture. To begin with,
the two countries show different patterns of territorial distribution of funding. As
the automotive industry is geographically strongly concentrated, it is not surprising
that a handful of regions receive most of the funding: in Romania, out of 43 coun-
ties, Arges¸, Bucures¸ti, Mures¸ and Sibiu received 70% of all EU support to the auto-
motive industry and in Poland 3 out of 16 voivodships accounted for 57% of all EU
grants (Dolnosla˛skie, Sla˛skie, and Wielkopolskie). But whereas these three Polish
regions are the hubs of the Polish automotive industry, and their weight in terms of
the number of firms, sectoral employment and revenue is similar to their share of
funding, the four Romanian regions account for just slightly above a third of the sec-
tor’s firms and employment and less than half (45%) of the revenue.
Similar differences exist with regard to the funding for SMEs. Most importantly,
a significantly larger proportion of the automotive SMEs benefited from EU funds
in Poland – 26%, compared to just 16.5% in Romania.7 Moreover, 70% of all the
automotive contracts in Poland went to SMEs compared to only 51% in Romania
(Figure 1). Furthermore, while average funding for a single contract with a large
firm was at a similar level in both countries (EUR 2.02 million in Poland vs. EUR
1.86 million in Romania), the average size of the contracts with SMEs reveals a big
gap (EUR 0.17 million in Poland vs. EUR 0.43 million in Romania).8
These differences suggest that the Polish automotive SMEs performed far better
at accessing EU funds than similar firms in Romania. Not only was more money
channeled to Polish SMEs, but a considerably greater proportion of them in the
otherwise much larger Polish industry benefited from EU funds. The Polish state
also demonstrated ability to effectively administer a greater number of contracts to
a broader range of beneficiaries, whereas Romania showed a clear preference for
larger and therefore more easily managed contracts.
We argue that the observed differences are not accidental but owe to differences
in state capacities, specifically to the different capacity of the domestic institutional
networks to promote the development of SMEs and help them access funding
opportunities. The superior capacities of the Polish state both in terms of fund
administration and maintenance of a support network for SMEs have resulted in a
more inclusive funding pattern despite the similarly powerful presence of large
players. Meanwhile, in Romania, weak state capacities impede the use of EU funds
according to the objectives of transnational industrial policy. This is because the
administration, management and implementation of EU-funded projects require
strong bureaucratic capacities. If those are insufficient, it becomes more convenient
to disburse large amounts of funds to few big enterprises with high absorption cap-
acity instead of contracting the same amount to hundreds of small businesses.9
Consequently, the combination of weak state capacities and low institutional sup-
port for SMEs with the presence of large, powerful companies in a key economic
sector translated into a less inclusive, less diversified, and more concentrated distri-
bution of EU support in the Romanian automotive sector. The next section brings
more insight into the evolution and organization of institutional structures that
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determine the difference in the outcome of transnational policy in the
two countries.
4. Domestic state capacities in the transnational integration regime
What do these institutional support structures look like, and where do they come
from? This is a question that has preoccupied development literature for decades,
and we can hardly hope to answer it in this short section. We do, however, hope
to lay ground for further inquiry by highlighting the confluence of political compe-
tition, ideology, and transnational influences that have shaped the institutional
environments of Poland and Romania before and after their accession to the EU.
4.1. Poland
Despite its general commitment to FDI-led development, the Polish state has been
building up support networks for smaller domestic firms from the very start of
transition. Following a brief and failed attempt of neoliberal shock-therapy after
the change of regime, successive Polish governments have made use of more inter-
ventionist industrial policy, establishing public agencies and programs aimed at
development of domestic enterprises, in particular SMEs. This ‘developmentalist’
orientation survived despite changes in ideological positions and policy toolkits: in
the 1990s, both the Solidarity governments and the coalition led by the communist
successor party adopted an interventionist stance and continued many of each
other’s industrial policy initiatives (King & Sznajder, 2006). Such broad cross-party
agreements – although often emerging as a consequence of the incumbents’
internal political divisions – were also observed in other policy fields such as in the
case of pension reforms (Makszin, 2013), and became even stronger after the turn
of millennium. Following its re-election in 2011, the coalition led by the center-
right civic platform (PO) launched a series of programs to promote Polish industry,
and these were added to by the successor government of the conservative law and
justice (PiS) party (Kozarzewski & Bałtowski, 2017). A particular example for policy
continuity is a loan program called Technology Credit Fund (Fundusz Kredytu
Technologicznego), which is run by the state development bank (Bank
Gospodarstwa Krajowego, BGK). The program is open exclusively to SMEs that
received commercial loans to develop new technologies. BGK pays part of the loan
as a ‘technological premium’ to the applicant’s bank, which eases the financial bur-
den on the company and also reduces credit risk.10 It was initiated in 2005 by a
left-wing government and continued to operate during the three successive govern-
ments that extended the program by incorporating EU funding both in the
2007–2013 and 2014–2020 funding periods (Kiełek-WieRcławska & Stawasz, 2015).
The high degree of policy continuity facilitated the development of a network of
public agencies which by now constitute a thick background for industrial policy.
Importantly, many of these agencies have received financial and operational sup-
port from the EU, which reinforces the transnational character of industrial policy.
At the time of writing11, the most important institutions serving industrial
development belong to the Polish Development Fund (PFR Group), which was
established in 2016 by the PiS government. The creation of PFR was a main step
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towards accomplishing the Strategy for Responsible Development (Ministry of
Development, 2016), which is a long-term economic roadmap for Poland drafted
by Mateusz Morawiecki, current Prime Minister and former Minister of
Development. The document reinforces the state’s developmentalist direction and
specifies re-industrialization and the strengthening of innovative local companies
(especially SMEs) as the cornerstones of the future (‘more Polish economy in the
Polish economy’) while also remaining open to foreign investors in the high value-
added segments. The Plan considers EU funds vital for further invest-
ment promotion.
A key member of the PFR Group is the Industrial Development Agency (ARP),
which dates back to 1990. Initially, it facilitated privatization (Shields, 2004) but
later gained a prominent role in firm restructuring. In the mid-1990s ARP was also
critical in establishing regional development agencies (RDA), which, though vary-
ing in size and competence, provide crucial low-cost consulting and training serv-
ices to firms (McDermott, 2004, pp. 208–209). Already at this stage the EU’s role
proved decisive: the RDAs were initially financed through a PHARE project.12
Later, some RDAs became PHARE managing units, channeling support for the cre-
ation of regional business infrastructure, and after the accession the largest of them
took charge of the implementation of SME-supporting EU programs as intermedi-
ary bodies cooperating with the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PARP;
Ferry, 2007).13
PARP is the most important central body supporting SMEs. It was founded in 2001
with the assistance of PHARE funds, as a more expansive version of its predecessor,
Polish Foundation for SME Promotion and Development. Soon, PARP became respon-
sible for the management of national and EU funds for entrepreneurship (Grabowski,
Pamukcu, Szczygielski, & Tandogan, 2013), and in 2007 it led the establishment of the
National System of Services (Krajowy System Usług, KSU) – a network of institutions
that provided free services to SMEs, including support in writing applications for EU
funds. The KSU’s financing originally came from the EU14, but now it operates on
commercial basis15 and consists of country-wide Consultation Points that advise SMEs
on commercializing new technologies, access to EU funds and enterprise management
(Woodward, Wojnicka, & Pander, 2012).
Other initiatives have been focused on helping SMEs enter the large firms’ value
chains at a higher level, through more intensive technological cooperation. The
National Center for Research and Development (NCRD) channels EU funds
through the Fast Lane (Szybka Scie _zka) program16, which encourages the cooper-
ation between large enterprises and SMEs involved in industrial research and devel-
opment.17 Drawing on its own resources, ARP has taken a similar initiative called
Technology Transfer Platform (Platforma Transferu Technologii), which aims to
connect SMEs with large companies in need of innovative solutions.18
Sectoral programs also foster cooperation among firms, investors, consultants
and research units. Besides managing support plans in the energy, railway and
chemical industries,19 in 2014 the NCRD launched the Innomoto program in the
automotive sector. This initiative, which is partly funded from OP Smart Growth
and aims at increasing R&D and technological innovations, was established with
the involvement of the most important representatives of the domestic automotive
industry and is expected to further facilitate technological cooperation between the
large firms and SMEs.20
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In sum, the Polish political elite’s lasting consensus over the importance of local
SME’s for the country’s development has ensured the continuity of industrial policy
programs and created strong capacities for upgrading (see also Markiewicz, this
issue). The Polish state used the resources of the EU’s transnational industrial pol-
icy not only to support individual firms, but also to build up a network of agencies
that assist SMEs. This is in sharp contrast to Romania where generous funding for
individual firms, both foreign and domestic, was not accompanied by a more com-
prehensive institutional support to entrepreneurs (see Vukov, this issue).
4.2. Romania
Romania is a relative latecomer to FDI-led development: for most of the 1990s the
successive governments tried to preserve a system in which a degree of liberaliza-
tion was combined with protection of the key domestic firms and industries, often
by keeping them in public hands (see Vukov, this issue). The resulting ‘cocktail
capitalism’ (Cernat, 2006) suffered from anemic economic performance, and also
ran afoul of the EU’s market rules. As the negotiations for the country’s EU mem-
bership began, Romania took a sharp turn towards radical liberalization (Ban,
2016; Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). The main thrust of industrial policy since has
been to attract foreign investors, with a few half-hearted attempts to promote local
SMEs (Ban, 2016).
Under the EU’s tutelage, Romania’s earlier industrial policy tools were deemed
non-transparent and fiscally unsound, and were replaced by a more streamlined
system which distributed modest amounts of aid on a fully competitive basis.
Transparency, competitive allocation and discouragement of ‘sectoral’ (i.e. rescue
and restructuring aid) in favor of ‘horizontal’ (new investments) policy goals bene-
fited newly arriving foreign firms over the incumbent players who still struggled
with the legacies of transition. Foreign investment was actively encouraged by the
EU, which saw it as the fastest tool to revive Romania’s flagging economy
(European Commission, 1997).
With the shift away from ‘domestic champions’, the post-2000 period also saw a
wave of policy efforts directed at SMEs. This included creation, in 2000, of a
Ministry for SME, three years later transformed into the National Agency for SMEs
and Co-operation (NASMEC). The 2004 Act on SMEs and the 2004–2008 Strategy
for support to the SME sector laid the legal basis for assisting the development of
small businesses. With active support of the EU’s PHARE program, NASMEC’s
responsibilities and budget also increased, reaching about EUR 60 million in 2006.
The agency’s administrative and programmatic capacities were further strengthened
in anticipation of its future responsibilities for the management of SME-destined
portion of the EU funds. In 2004–2006 NASMEC benefited from about EUR 7 mil-
lion via PHARE-funded technical assistance and twinning projects (Government of
Romania, 2007).
The spread of policy ideas from the EU level as well as the opportunities created
by its policies in this period gave rise to a host of other initiatives for development
of local business support structures: incubators, industrial parks, technology and
science parks, and clusters. Despite all these efforts, however, the weakness of
domestic institutions remains starkly apparent, especially when compared to
Poland. First, the institutional architecture for the support of SMEs is relatively
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young, and the rapid multiplication of programs and institutions has made the sys-
tem less coherent as well as less transparent for the potential beneficiaries. Nearly
half of SMEs are not at all familiar with the existence of these support structures,
while many others consider them irrelevant to their own needs (Hunya, 2011).
Part of the problem lies with the fact that, unlike Poland’s, Romania’s institu-
tional system has remained heavily centralized. In 2002–2006, in order to comply
with the requirements of the EU’s regionally-based cohesion policy, Romania estab-
lished eight ‘development regions’, each presided over by an RDA. RDAs are the
bodies formally in charge of implementing regional development policy, including
the development of business support systems. But whereas in Poland RDAs had a
chance to build up their capacities and links to the local business communities
over a longer period, Romanian RDA’s lack both experience and authority. As
Romania’s ‘regions’ are little more than statistical units without legislative or execu-
tive powers, the RDAs are in a weak administrative position, without much ability
to either formulate effective development plans or mobilize local administration for
their implementation (Ranga, 2010; Suciu, 2013).
NASMEC, for its part, has also been slow to set up regional offices, and was
therefore often seen by firms as a distant bureaucratic body with little awareness of
the needs of local companies (OECD, 2005). When local offices were eventually set
up in 2007, they remained weakly equipped and understaffed, without much cap-
acity to assist firms beyond offering basic information on NASMEC’s programs.
The situation was further aggravated by an underdeveloped private consultancy
sector: in 2008, 40% of all consultancy firms were based in Bucharest-Ilfov region
and they accounted for two-third of all the turnover generated in the entire sector
(Hunya, 2011). As we have seen in the previous section, this lack of domestic infra-
structure is clearly reflected in the limited access of automotive SMEs to EU fund-
ing, as well as in the skewed distribution of funding in terms of company size
and location.
Finally, unlike in Poland where the cross-party consensus on industrial develop-
ment ensured remarkable policy continuity, in Romania political power struggles
both between and within governing parties often led to disruptive institutional
overhauls. The collapse of the coalition government of the National Liberal Party
(NLP) and Democratic Party (DP) just before the start of the 2007 financing period
resulted in a minority government led by NLP and a ministerial reshuffle which,
among other, assimilated NASMEC into a newly founded Ministry for SMEs,
Trade, and Business Environment. Two years later, the NLP lost the election, and
the incoming government dissolved the Ministry for SMEs and integrated it with
the Ministry of Economy, thus merging all bodies in charge of EU funds to the pri-
vate sector under a single roof. In 2012, following a corruption scandal and a tem-
porary funding freeze by the EU, the Ministry transferred the responsibility for
SME applications to the RDAs, but did not allocate additional resources to enable
these bodies to manage their new duties. The reason for this major institutional
reorganization was the discovery of a complex embezzlement scheme which
involved more than 100 ‘ghost’ companies misappropriating more than EUR 20
million (Surubaru, 2017b).
The systematic weaknesses in Romania’s administrative capacity, political
instability, and widespread corruption precluded the efficient use of EU funds: in
2007–2013 five out of the seven Romanian OPs had to be either interrupted or
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suspended by the EU because of serious irregularities affecting management and
implementation (Surubaru, 2017a). Furthermore, the frequent changes in govern-
ment21 and the politicization of public administration involved high staff turnover
in the agencies responsible for EU funds and resulted in repeated institutional
reshuffling (Surubaru, 2017b, 2017a). All of this prevented the gradual expansion
of the institutional support network for SMEs that we observed in Poland.
There are, however, some exceptions to this generally weak institutional land-
scape. One such is the West region of Romania, whose RDA has managed to create
a developmental coalition with local county offices, and mobilize funding from
various international projects for the improvement of business environment. Not
incidentally, this region is also home to some of the most successful examples of
inclusive industrial policy: the Automotivest cluster of automotive firms is based
around large international firms but has a strong supplier development program
supporting their linkages to local firms, and the Tehimpol incubator for high-tech
start-ups (Vukov, this issue). While transnational integration has succeeded in pro-
viding opportunities for such local development initiatives, at the national level
most programs have been undermined by a weak, unstable, and highly politicized
institutional environment.
5. Conclusion
With the rise of global value chains and the deepening of transnational regulation,
the rules of the game of economic development have changed. Foreign capital has
taken the pride of place as more and more countries abandoned the hopes of
breeding their own domestic industrial champions. This has given rise to fears of a
new type of dependency, in which the race to attract foreign capital, combined
with the loss of domestic policy tools, would drain states’ resources and limit pros-
pects for a more comprehensive and diversified form of development.
In this paper, we set out to explore an alternative proposition: that transnational
integration, at least in some of its forms, may provide developing countries with
alternative tools to resist the downsides of this structural dependence on FDI, by
replacing domestic with transnational industrial policy. In doing so, we build on the
argument that the TIRs – the main vehicles through which integration has been tak-
ing place in the past decades – do not merely amplify, but manage globalization. In
other words, while constraining their members’ autonomy to an unprecedented
degree, they also provide them with additional resources to advance upgrading.
Using the EU as the most prominent example of this approach, we focused on a
particular tool that the EU offers to its members: transnational funding for develop-
ment of SMEs and investments into high value-added activities such as research and
innovation. We studied the distribution of EU funding to the automotive industry in
Poland and Romania – two countries often invoked as examples of DMEs – to gauge
the extent to which it complied with the goals of transnational policy.
Our findings give reason for some cautious optimism. On the one hand, a very
large portion of funding that in theory should be earmarked for development of
SMEs has been allocated to large, mostly foreign, companies in both Poland and
Romania. Their enormous market power, superior competitiveness, and absorption
capacity thus present real limitations on the ability of transnational industrial pol-
icy to foster broad industrial upgrading. At the same time, we do find some
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evidence that the transnational rules have tempered the bargaining power of these
firms, because the share of EU funding they received is lower than their weight in
the industry’s output or employment, and much lower than their share of domestic
state aid. One should bear in mind that we had purposely chosen the automotive
as a limiting case. The industry’s top-heavy structure and enormous weight in the
economies of both countries make it especially difficult to ignore the demands of
its lead firms. Even moderate evidence of effectiveness of transnational policy in
terms of diversification of funding is therefore encouraging, and we expect research
in other sectors to uncover even greater scope for countering the structural con-
straints of dependent development through transnational industrial policy.
Moreover, concerning the portion of funding that does get allocated to the SMEs,
we find significant differences between the two countries. While in Romania a small
number of relatively large SMEs absorb all funding, in Poland it is more evenly dis-
tributed across regions and firms. We explain the more distributive pattern of alloca-
tion in Poland with greater domestic state capacity to create and maintain
institutions which support SMEs and help them integrate into global value chains.
Our findings thus confirm the view that domestic institutional quality represents
a critical ingredient for successful adaptation to the intensifying competition trig-
gered by globalization (Weiss, 2004). More importantly, however, we also find that
transnational agency can be instrumental for the strengthening of domestic institu-
tions: nearly all public bodies that have played a role in facilitating the access of
Polish SMEs to EU funding, as well as in supporting their development and
upgrading more generally, have at some point received technical and financial sup-
port from the EU. In combination with a broad cross-party consensus on develop-
ment policy (Markiewicz, this issue) this allowed Poland to develop a solid
institutional environment that can leverage transnational resources for domestic
growth. In Romania, similar efforts on the EU’s part did not yield the same results
and the institutions in charge of SMEs remain weak. In line with Ban (2016) and
(Vukov, this issue) we trace this failure of transnational policy to enduring political
instability that precluded the emergence of a broad developmentalist consensus of
the kind observed in Poland and instead led to corruption and policy
discontinuity.
We are well aware that this is only the start of the enquiry. The EU’s trans-
national industrial policy has been at work for much longer in Poland than in
Romania, and has also changed shapes and objectives several times in the course of
these countries’ integration into the EU. In spite of the various benefits it may
bring, by no means transnational industrial policy represents a fool-proof solution
to the pressing issues commonly associated with promoting domestic industries in
DMEs. Difficulties with access to finance and the resulting liquidity problems still
feature among the biggest challenges to SMEs not only in Romania (Anton &
Onofrei, 2016) but also in Poland (Klonowski, 2012). Development literature has
long pointed to the importance of institutions for economic growth, but it has pro-
duced few answers on how the ‘right’ institutions might be acquired. Our paper
provides empirical support for the argument that transnational industrial policy
can fruitfully contribute to this process, but the precise mechanisms of the influ-
ence, and the way they interact with various sectoral and national realities, deserve
to be studied in much greater depth.
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Notes
1. Emerging Markets Information System (EMIS) and Dun & Bradstreet (D&B).
2. Polish Chamber of Automotive Industry and Automotivesuppliers.pl in Poland; the
Association of Automobile Manufacturers (ACAROM) in Romania.
3. Interview with a state aid expert working for a private consulting agency, Warsaw, 30
November 2017.
4. In the 2007–2013 programming period, the total budget of EU funds amounted to
EUR 67.3 billion in Poland and EUR 19.7 billion in Romania (European Commission
2007). Of this, EUR 19.1 billion (30%) in Poland and EUR 2.8 billion (15%) in
Romania benefited private firms (expressed in 2016 EUR).
5. Interviews with the former Deputy CEO of ARP, Warsaw, 30 November 2017 and
with the former President of PARP, Warsaw, 1 December 2017.
6. While the contribution of the automotive sector to the manufacturing value added is
similar in both countries (9% in Poland vs. 12% in Romania), in Romania the
automotive industry received a much greater share of EU support: 5.33% of all EU
funding to private firms went to the automotive compared to 1.56% in Poland.
7. A two-sample Z test for proportions confirms that the difference in the share of
funded SMEs is significant (z¼ 3.08; p< 0.01).
8. An independent samples t test confirms the significant difference between the average
value per contracts with SMEs in the two countries (t(375)¼7.282; p< 0.01).
9. This point was mentioned by an interviewed Polish state aid expert, Warsaw, 30
November 2017.
10. Interview with the former Deputy CEO of ARP, Warsaw, 30 November 2017.
11. October 2018.
12. PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) was a
developmental assistance program created by the EU in 1989 originally targeting
Poland and Hungary. Later, PHARE was extended to all the CEE candidate countries
and became one of the most important pre-accession instrument assisting institution-
building and economic restructuring.
13. For a list of these RDAs, please consult PARP’s website (http://pokl.parp.gov.pl/index/
index/1335, accessed on 3 October 2018).
14. For more information consult: https://www.parp.gov.pl/punkty-konsultacyjne-ksu-3
(accessed on 3 October 2018).
15. Interviews with the former Deputy CEO of ARP, Warsaw, 30 November 2017 and
with the former President of PARP, Warsaw, 1 December 2017.
16. More information (in Polish) is available in the NCBR’s webpage: https://www.ncbr.
gov.pl/programy/fundusze-europejskie/ (accessed on 3 October 2018).
17. Interview with a state aid expert working for a private consulting agency, Warsaw, 30
November 2017.
18. Interview with the former Deputy CEO of ARP, Warsaw, 30 November 2017.
19. Interview with a state aid expert working for a private consulting agency, Warsaw, 30
November 2017.
20. Interview with the President of PZPM, Warsaw, 1 December 2017 and information
from Innomoto webpage (http://innomoto.com.pl/?page_id=84, accessed on 3
October 2018).
21. Between November 2005 and November 2015, the composition of the governing
coalition or the Prime Minister changed ten times in Romania but only three times in
Poland (source: ParlGov).
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